Introduction
Individual managers seldom have access to all relevant information, so when truly important decisions have to be made, a group is usually formed tr) make the decision or to advise the indiviL,l who must make it (Hackman and Kaplan 1974) . Group discussion enables participant: ti share information so that the group as a whole can access a larger pool of information than anv one person acting alone (Shaw 1981 ).
The c:-:+ange of information is the key difference _-?tween individual and group decision mat'2i.Jand the key element of group decision :.laking. The fundamental purpose for using groups to make organizational decisions is to enable a more complete exchange and consideration of information and individual preferences about decision alternatives. However, information exchange in group deoision making is often done poorly; much unique information known to some participants is never shared with the group (Stasser 1992) . This unique information can be important, and poor decisions can result when it is not considered (Gigone and Hastie 1993; Stasser and Stewart 1992; Thompson 1991) .
Information technologies such as Group Support Systems (GSS) have the potential to fundamentally change the nature of information exchange in group discussion (DeSanctis and Gallupe 1987) . The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of GSS use on the exchange and use of information in group decision making for a hidqen profile task (one in which each participant receives different information about the task and the optimal decision is hidden).
Information and Group Decision Making

Information distribution
In decision-making situations, participants typically have a host of information about alternatives. This information shapes participants' prediscussion preferences and, as participants communicate information during discussion, shapes the group's decision. The information that participants hold can be distributed in a variety of ways. Information can be:
Common: known to all participants before group discussion; Unique:
known to only one participant before group discustiron; or Partially shared: know.1 to some but not all participants before grout: dir.cussion.
Figure la, which build& ';n Stasser and Titus (1985) illustrates a case where a three-member group must choose between three alternatives, and all information is common; each participant holds the same complete set of positive and negative information about the alternatives. Each participant would evaluate the information and, assuming positive and negative information was weighted equally, would choose Alternative A because it has more positives than negatives (A has five pieces of positive information and three negative, versus B with four positive and four negative, and C with three positive and four negative). In this case, most group decisions would be the same as the three participants' individual prediscussion choices -the optimal choice, Alternative A.
The focus of this research is on situations in which participants have a combination of "common" and "unique" information. Only situations where participants make decisions based on available information were considered. Situations where participants have predetermined preferences and will not change them (e.g., vested interest in certain outcomes) are beyond the scope of this research.
Unique information can be distributed so that it is unbiased; that is, the group should reach the same decision with or without the unique information. Figure 1 b illustrates the same decision situation, but this time participants hold different sets of positive and negative information about the alternatives.
For example, some information about Alternative A is common, while other information is unique. Participants would make prediscussion decisions based on only the information they hold, and each would likely make the same choice -Alternative A. Accordingly, the group decision would also likely be A. If the participants pooled the unique information, they would make the same decision; so in this case, there is no ~'"2 in pooling the unique information through group discussion.
However, information can be distributeJ so that the optimal alternative is hidden -:ulled a "hidden profile" task (Stasser 1992) . ;igure lc illustrates the same situation, but th ri:,,e the information held by two participar .L favors a less optimal alternative (B), while I::.-third participant holds information pointing to the optimal alternative (A). Hidden profile tasks need not be those in which a majority/minority exists within the group (e.g., see Stasser and Titus 1987) , but for the sake of example it is used in this research. In Figure lc prediscussion preferences will likely differ, with patticipants one and two favoring Alternative B and participant three favoring Alternative A. If group discussion does not raise all available but unique information, the group will likely Note: There are three alternatives, A, 8, and C. A+ indicates positive information about Alternative A, A-indicates negative information about A, and so on for B+, B-, C+, and C-. The circles show the information known to each of three participants. Alternative A is the optimal choice because it has the most positive and fewest negative pieces of information.
Figure 1. Sample Cases of Prediscussion Information Distribution
choose the less optimal decision favored by the majority, Alternative 6. Here, the value of the unique. information is high, yet empirical studies have found that for such hidden profile tasks, much unique information is not exchanged (Stasser and Titus 1985; .
Information exchange and use in verbally interacting groups
In order to reach a group decision, participants engage in three activities simultaneously (see Briggs 1995) : information recall (either from memory or notes), information exchange (either giving or receiving information), and information processing (actually using the information: assessing the cognitive and social implications of the information and storing it in memory). Humans have a limited amount of cognitive resources to spread across these three activities (Ball and Zuckerman 1992; Norman 1976) . Most people can engage in only one activity at one time, so that engaging in any one activity limits the ability to engage in the other two. For example, actively listening to discussion blocks the processing of newly received information and the recall of related information (Lamm and Trommsdorff 1973) . Each of the three activities is described in more detail h+w: Information recall. Information recall by the group as a whole is biased toward common information btzause of the laws of probability; common information known by all participants is more likely to be remembered by at least one individrial than is unique information known on?; to one participant (Stasser and Titus 1987) . Individuals are also more likely to remember information the more they are exposed to it (Stasser, et al. 1989) , thus reinforcing the bias to common information. Group discussions, therefore, often focus on common, not unique, information because common information is more likely to be recalled.
Information
exchange.
The exchange of information in verbal discussion is not perfect; not all recalled information is actually contributed. Participants must first decide to contribute the information and then have th opportunity to contribute it. In deciding :o car tribute information, participants assess the re evance of !he information and the social imp1 cations of contributing it. Relevance depenc on the information's match to the current top. of conversation. Group discussions tend to b thematic and follow single trains of thougt (termed cognitive inerr,a (Lamm an Trommsdorff 1973) ). This inertia may OCCL because rehashing information under discu: sion can appear more relevant than introduc ing new unique information that is not close linked to the current discussion.
Social motivation may also reduce the inform; tion that participacts choose to exchange Participants are often motivated to defend c support their initial preference, so the infom; tion they choose to contribute often favors the preferences or attacks an alternative (Stassf and Titus 1985) . Information contradicting th preferences of the majority is less likely to b exchanged (Hackman and Kaplan 1974 because participants may fear a negative eva uation of their comments (Diehl and Stroeb 1987; Lamm and Trommsdorff 1973) .
There are many "process losses" (SteinE 1972 ) that reduce the opportunities t exchange information. One of the most impor tant process losses in verbi: discussion is th need to take turns speaki:lg (Harkins and Pett 1987; Van de Ven and Pelbecq 1971 ) Participants must comp& with each other fo opportunities to contribute. 3nly one perso: can speak at one time, so aI1 Jther participant: are blocked from contributi: 4. This "productior blocking" (Diehl and Street? 10, 7) significant ly reduces the exchz .I:'; of informatior because participants whc r-e prevented fron contributing information as they choose ofter forget or suppress it because it seems less relevant or less important later in the discussior (Lamm and Trommsdorff 1973) . information use. Once information i: exchanged, participants must actually proces: it before it can affect decisions. There are twc "routes" by which information is processec (Petty and Cacioppo 1986 ). The first is the "central route," in which participants activel! lnformatfon Sharing in Gmups assess the information and its quality and integrate it into their overall understanding of the situation and their preferences. This process of opinion formation is also called persuasive arguments or information influence. The second route is the "peripheral route," in which participants' preferences are shaped more by peripheral cues such as the attractiveness or number of people arguing for a position, rather than the quality of the information itself. This process is also called social comparison or normative influence.
Information influence theory (a.k.a. persuasive arguments theory) holds that changes in preferences occur when participants cognitively process key factual information (Shaw 1981) . When participants learn new information from others, they consider this information in light of their existing information (which may trigger the recall of related information) (Burnstein and Vinokur 1973) . This reconsideration may result in a change in preference. The key point is that under information influence theory, the information itself, not the preferences of others, causes the reconsideration and change in preference. Several experiments have found changes in preferences in cases where participants' ability to communicate was restricted to objective information (i.e., no information about others' preferences), providing evidence that information influence is present in grou? enteraction (e.g., Bumstein and Vinokur 1~73).
Information influence theory ar+es that unique information should be more persiasive than common information already known and considered (Myers and Lamm 1976; Vinokur, et al. 1975) . However, empirical evidc?ce !ias found that unique information is rno;.? iikely to be ignored after it is first mentione,' than is common information known to all participants (Stasser et al. 1989) . Decisions are more likely to be based on common information known before discussion than on unique information received during discussion (Gigone and Hastie 1993) .
One reason why unique information is ignored may lie in the need to cognitively process information. Experiments have found that when participants actively process information (e.g., writing it down, verbally responding to it, or pausing to think about it), preferences are more strongly affected (Burnstein and Vinokur 1973) . During group discussions, participants may lack the opportunity to process the information they ,receive because they must pay attention to other participants (cognitive blocking); if they don't pay attention, they will miss the others' contributions (Lamm and Trommsdorff 1973) . Therefore, unique information first received by participants during discussion may be processed only superficially and not considered as fully as information studied before discussion begins.
The way in which this new information is processed is also affected by an individual's prediscussion information and the choices generated. Information that supports prediscussion information and choices is more thoroughly processed and integrated into an individual's cognitive schema (Petty and Cacioppo 1986) . In contrast, individuals have a greater tendency to develop counter arguments to information that challenges their initial decisions (Wood 1982) . Also, when presented with messages containing information supporting both sides of an issue, individuals tend to focus on the information supporting their preference and discount the information opposing it (Lord, et al. 1979) ; thus the net effects of such 'unbiased" communication is often to strengthen a priori preferences.
The way in which information is processed may also change depending on whether participants are aware of others' preferences. When faced by a group majority whose preferences are different from theirs, participants assume the majority to be correct and focus on comparing their preference to that of the majority (Moscovici 1980) . "The world of alternatives is reduced to two" (Nemeth 1986, p. 25 ). In contrast, when faced by a minority with a different preference, participants are motivated to assume that minorii participants are incorrect and initially dismiss them (Maass and Clark 1984; Nemeth 1986 ). Only if the minority is consistent in presenting information and opinions and does not yield to majority pressure do participants realize that the minority is convinced of its position and make attempts to understand it (Moscovici 1980) . fnformation is re-examined from many perspectives, not just that of the minority, to understand why it has led to different conclusions (Maass and Clark 1984; Nemeth 1986) . Information from minority participants may be more thoroughly processed than information from the majority because minority participants are perceived to be more independent or more dissimilar from one another than are members of the majority (Harkins and Petty 1987) .
Normative influence theory (a.k.a. social comparison theory) argues that participants are motivated to conform to the opinions of others to preserve a favorable self-perception and self-presentation (Myers and Lamm 1976) . From this perspective, the knowledge of preferences is more important than knowledge of the information on which they are based. There are two theoretical linkages.
First, after obtaining information about others' preferences, participants may change their preference to more closely match that of the others, either through choice or coercion (Hackman and Kaplan 1974) . Participants also may not change their preference but just state ; more socially acceptable preference than their true preference. They simply comply with 'hr. majority preference to avoid further stress -without examining any information and without any change in their true preference (Maass a.ld Clark 1984) .
Second, publicly stating a preference may nake that preference stronger for three rea-.;ons. First, public commitment may make changing preferences more difficult without losing face (Salancik 1977) . Second, such statements may cause stronger internalization to reduce cognitive dissonance (Myers and Lamm 1976 Weick 1979; 1988) .
Normative influence theory holds that individual preference formation (and stating that preference to others) is affected by a social comparison of one's own preference to those of others. The theory claims that exposure t preference information is both necessary an sufficient to change participants' preference: While there is some empirical support for thi theory (Zuber, et al. 1992) , it is not overwhelrr ing (Myers and Lamm 1976; Shaw 1981) ; se\ eral studies have found that exposure to pa ticipants' preferences without supporting info mation leads to little preference change (se Myers and Lamm 1976) .
GSS effects on information exchange and use
GSSs provide new opportunities for inform; tion exchange that may differ in importar ways from non-GSS environments.
One c these is computer-mediated electronic comma nication that can augment or replace verb: communication (DeSanctis and Gallupe 1987 This electronic communication provides package of different components, each c which may introduce new dynamics into info mation exchange and use processes. PrevioL GSS research has found that GSS ca increase a group's use of factual informatio (i.e., informatior, ; luence) rather than partic pants' preferences (i.e., normative influencr (Clapper, et al. 1991; Huang, et al. 1993 Three GSS ,omponents likely affect informE tion exchange Lnd use: parallelism, grou' memory, and s.c,anymity (Nunamaker, et a' 1991) .
The first, paral!e.i;m, is the ability of all partic pants to enter information at the same time. A participants have computers that enable ther to contribute information and opinions by typ ing comments, which are immediately share with all other participants. Because all partic pants can type at the same time, no participar need wait for others to finish before contribu ing information. This parallelism mitigates th blocking that inhibits the exchange of inforrm tion in verbally interacting groups (Valacich, E al. 1994) . Parallelism may also encourage th exchange of different information. In verb: discussions, information tends to hollow on common theme (cognitive inertia). With pare lelism, many themes often emerge, which prc vides a broader discussion of key issues (see Dennis and Valacich 1994) . Thus, parallelism from GSS use should improve the exchange 'of information by increasing the amount of both common and unique information discussed by the group.
The second, group memory, means that all remarks typed into the computer are stored so that participants can refer to them later in the discussion. This has two important effects. The first is obvious: participants can more easily refer to previous information to reprocess it in conjunction with new information; they need not remember all contributed information. Thus, a group memory should improve the recall of both common and unique information.
A group memory may have a second important effect. One of the key problems in verbal discussion is that listening to information and processing it are mutually exclusive; listening to discussion blocks processing of new information, and information processing blocks the receipt of new information from discussion (Lamm and Trommsdorff 1973) . A group memory enables participants to enter or read information at their discretion. Participants can more easily pause to process Zarmation without risk of missing new infr,matton. They can decouple themselves from the discussion to think and then rejoin it at 511 (Nunamaker, et al. 1991) . 'In print [or on a computer screen), the recipient may process the message at an optimal pace, stopping to c;rnsider difficult points" (Petty and Caciopfbr lc36, p. 77) . When mental resources a? constrained an external group memory will r)Bsist participints in processing information (Rao and Jarvenpaa 1991) .
The third component is anonymity; participants make contributions without attaching their names, which may motivate them to participate differently. Anonymity may reduce the reluctance to contribute information that contradicts the dominant group preference (Nunamaker, et al. 1991) . In addition, participants also are often motivated to defend or support their initial preference, so the information they choose to contribute favors their preferences or attacks an alternative (Stasser and Titus 1965; . To the extent that this motivation stems from the need to save face about a publicly advocated decision preference, anonymity, which can obscure both the initial public statement of preference as well as any subsequent arguments for or against it, may reduce the tendency to contribute information supporting one's initial preference. It may also make participants more receptive to contrary information. Thus, anonymity may improve the exchange of information by increasing the amount of common and unique information discussed.
Previous GSS research has found that GSSs providing parallelism, group memory, and anonymity can increase a group's focus on and use of factual information rather than participants' preferences (Clapper, et al. 1991; Huang, et al. 1993) ; that is, GSS use can increase information influence rather than normative influence.
Summary and hypotheses
Participants in group discussions simultaneously engage in three information-related processes (information recall, information exchange, and information processing and use), each of which competes for limited ccgnitive resources. The focus in this study is on the exchange and use of information. This section summarizes the discussions above arrc; presents the hypotheses. Table 1 provides a summary. . . .
Information Exchange
There is often an incomplete exchange of information in verbal discussions, which may lead to poor decisions. As argued above, the use of a GSS may increase the amount of information exchanged because it provides parallelism (which reduces blocking and cognitive inertia), and anonymity (which may reduce the reluctance to contribute information challenging one's own preference or that of the group majority). Therefore: There is consistent evidence that a greater proportion of common rather than unique information is discussed.
Information recall is biased to common information because of probability (more participants have the common information) and cognitive factors (individuals are more likely to remember information the more they hear it). While a GSS may increase the amount of information exchanged, it is unlikely to have significant effects on the factors encouraging common rather than unique information. Therefore: H2: Participants are more likely to exchange common information than unique information, regardless of GSS use.
As argued above, participants tend to contribute information that supports their preferences and avoid information that contradicts
GSS Effects
Group memory may improve recall of unique informatio..
Parallelism may reduce cognitive inertia
Parallelism may reduce production blocking Anonymity may reduce the tendency to contribute information favoring own choice Group memory may reduce cognitive blocking Anonymity may encourage a minority to persist in its opinions Anonymity may reduce premature compliance Anonymity may ease face-saving them. If this is due to a perceived need defend qublicly stated positions, then anonyn ty, uLh obscures the authorship of stat ments, may reduce this tendency in GE gr n";ds. This leads to two hypotheses: H3a: Participants are more likely to COI ,:ribute information that supports the prediscussion preferences than net Yal or opposing information.
H3F Members of non-GSS groups 81
more likely to contribute informatic that supports their prediscussic preferences than are members ( GSS groups.
Information Use
One key question is whether the informatic exchanged is actually processed and used participants in making their decisions. 1 argued above, GSS should better enable p; ticipants to process information because it provides a group memory that enables participants to review information and to decouple themselves from the discussion to process it. Previous GSS research has found GSS use to increase a group's use of information (infonnation influence) rather than defer to participants' preferences (normative influence).
H4: Members of GSS groups are more likely to use the information exchanged in making their decisions than are members of non-GSS groups.
The discussion and use of more information should increase the time required to reach a decision compared to non-GSS groups, unless the GSS enables groups to contribute and process information faster. In general, previous research has found that GSS groups require a longer timeframe to make decisions (Benbasat and Lim 1993) . Therefore: H5: GSS groups will take longer to reach a decision than non-GSS groups.
In certain situations, such as hidden profile tasks, greater use of unique information will enable groups to Mter identify the optimal alternative (Tholrpson 1991). Anonymity may also reduce the pressure to conform to others' preferences an? #educe the loss of face in backing down from previous positions, making it easier for participaots to change their preferences based on thr processing of new, unique information. There,ore:
H6: When unique information is important in identifyi.rg the optimal decision, members of GSS groups will make better decisions than members of non-GSS groups.
Changes in preferences based on the analysis of information (i.e., information influence) are stronger and more lasting than changes resulting from just accepting the majority preference (i.e., normative influence) (Burnstein and Vinokur 1973) . Thus, the more complete exchange and use of information in GSS groups should encourage participants to have more agreement with the group's decision after lnfomration Sharing in Groups group discussion (i.e., greater consensus change). H7: GSS groups will have greater consensus change than non-GSS groups.
Method
Participants
One hundred forty sophomore, junior, and senior university business students were drawn from a core business course and received course credit for participating. The average age was 21 years, and 54% were male. Prior to participating in the experiment, subjects received a Xl-minute lecture on decision making and a 50.minute lecture on GSS.
Subjects were randomly assigned into one of two treatments (GSS or non-GSS). Group sizes in previous experimental studies have ranged from two (e.g;, Gallupe, et al. 1992 ) to as many as 16 (e.g., Dennis, et al. 1990 ). This study used a group size of 10 members.
Task
The task information set askec' &tticipants to select one student from a set of f0.u fictitious students for admission to the uniw?rsity. The task was designed with the assistance of the university Admissions Office. Tn$ crmplete information set included positive !:agative, or neutral information on 19 criteria ior each alternative (a total of 76 pieces of information). All information included in the task was the same information required on the university's admissions application, was able to be deduced from that information (e.g., size of home town), or was known to the admissions office (e.g., high school quality). Information on six criteria (24 pieces) was "common' (i.e., given to ail participants), while information on the remaining 13 criteria (52 pieces) was "unique" (i.e., distributed so each piece was known to only one participant).
Each participant received 24 pieces.of common information, plus an addi-tional two to 12 pieces of unique information (a mean of 5.2). Table 2 shows how each piece of information was distributed.
In order to test the effects of increased information exchange, there needed to be disagreement among the prediscussion choices of the participants; otherwise they would simply agree on the same choice with no discussion. I chose to create a majority/minority situation (but had no interest per se in examining the effects of minority influence) because this type of hidden profile situation can prove particularly challenging for groups to identify the optimal alternative.
Seven participants received a subset of information favoring the same suboptimal alternative (Alternative l), while three received a subset of information favoring the optimal alternative (Alternative 3). Just over 74% of the subjects made the prediscussion decisions intended by the information they received. In all 14 groups, the task was successful in creating disagreement among prediscussion choices. In 12 of the 14 groups, there was the intended majority/ minority (but not always 7-3; sometimes 6-4 or Out-of-State (7) State Capital (7) Town (7) Size of Residence Small Town (7) Large City (7) Small Town (7) Large City (7) Parents' Education University (6) University (6) None (6) University (6) Parents' Job Teacher (6) Manager (6) Farmer (6) Computer Analyst (6) Motivation to Attend
Self (1) Family (1) Family (1) Self (1) lnfcxmation Sharing in Groups 6-3-l). In two groups (one GSS, one non-GSS), there was no prediscussion majority; participants split evenly among the two major alternatives.
The task was pilot-tested four times. The complete information version of the task was independently validated by three admissions officers (the director of admissions and two associate directors) to ensure that the alternative designed to be optimal was optimal. The complete information version of the task was also validated by 28 students who did not participate in the study but who were drawn from the same pool as those in the study. Twenty-two (79%) chose the optimal choice; five (19%) chose the second best alternative, and one (2%) chose the third alternative.
Procedures
The experimental procedures followed those of Stasser and Titus (1985) . Participants first read the task and made an individual decision. The task information was removed, and participants then worked together as a group (using either a GSS or non-GSS) to reach a unanimous group decision or until 30 minutes had elapsed (30 minutes was chosen because pilot tests indicated that groups that made decisions did so easily within this time limit, while groups that exceeded 30 minutes did not come to a unanimous decision). Finally, participants completed a )-W-session questionnaire that asked them tc ,n;lire another individual decision (the salllt: as or different from the group decision), to recall the information they discussed, and to report several perceptions.
Treatments
All experimental sessions were held in the same GSS meeting room that contained 22 computers recessed under glass-topped tables. The tables were arranged in a U shape, with one additional row running across the top of the U and a second row running through its middle. The sides and middle row were used in this study, enabling all 10 participants to sit in a U.
GSS Treatment
Participants in the GSS treatment used two software tools (Group Outliner and Quick Vote) from the DOS version of the GroupSystems Electronic Meeting System (see Valacich, et al. 1991) . These provided electronic communication with parallelism, anonymity, and group memory. Group Outliner permits groups to define a series of topics in an outline structure and enter comments about each topic. For this study, the four alternatives were listed as separate topics and participants were not permitted to create new topics. This display was similar to the one in Figure 3 in Valacich, et al. (1991) . To enter or read comments, partlcipants would move the cursor to the alternative they wished to discuss or read and press enter. This opened a screen that displayed all comments made by others in a scrollable window on the top two-thirds of the screen, with a window for entering comments on the bottom one-third (similar to Figure 2 in Valacich, et al. 1991) .
Quick Vote enables groups to press a 'hot key" to invoke a vote while still using another tool such as Group Outline*. t.: this study, participants could press the "hot key" and choose from the list of four alternatives. The results of the vote were displayed on !!te wide-screen video projection system at the front of the room.
Group Outliner was chosen because it was designed for discussing a set of alternatives, and it was very simple to learn. This study required participants to learn four commands: the up and down arrow keys to move the cursor on the screen; the enter key to "open" a topic; the page up and page down keys to scroll the comments; and the F9 key to send a message. Nonetheless, participants received five minutes of training on how to use the GSS and sent at least one practice message before beginning to use it for the experiment (which is more training than I give when I facilitate "real" organizational groups). Voting required a similar amount of learning, and participants were instructed on which keys to press each time they votsd.
Participants were instructed to first use Group Outliner to exchange information without talking or voting because each had only a subset of all available information and would have to share information to make a good decision. They were also instructed either to type a comment requesting a vote or to verbally request a vote whenever they were ready to a vote (this first occurred anywhere from two to 15 minutes after the group began). The experimenter then verbally requested all participants to vote, informed them what keys to press, and pointed to the wide-screen video projection system to show the results of the vote. After the first vote, the participants were told that they could continue to type as well as discuss the issues verbally. All groups used both electronic and verbal communication after the first vote and continued until a unanimous decision was reached or time ran out.
Non-GSS Treatment
As in the GSS treatment, participants in the non-GSS treatment were instructed to first exchange information without votit-, because each had only a subset of all availabl!? information and would have to share infomsiion to make a good decision.
They weie also instructed to verbally request a vote :rhpn;ver they were ready to a vote (thiz fir&t vote occurred anywhere from one to 8 miri*es after they began). The experimenter then polled each participant for his or her choice and wrote the results of the vote on the white board at the front of the room.
Measures
The measures in this study were collected either at the group or individual level of analysis, depending upon the hypothesis.
information Exchange
The amount of common and unique inforr tion exchanged was measured at the grl level by one rater, who counted the piece: information in the group discussions (au,, tapes for non-GSS treatments; printed corn' er records and audio-tapes for GSS trc ments). The rater counted only the informa that correctly matched the information in task. For example, the task said that candic A was majoring in education, so informa about degree program for Candidate A 1 counted only if the subjects said the candic was majoring in education; if the subjects : that Candidate A was majoring in math, example, it would not have been countec second rater counted the information from f randomly selected groups (two GSS, two r GSS). Interrater reliability, measured UE Cohen's kappa, was .93, indicating adeqc agreement. The data from the first rater H analyzed using ANOVA. ANOVA is an ap; priate technique because it is robust to vi tions in assumptions and for relatively sr sample sizes (Neter, et al. 1985) .
The extent to which the discussion focusec common versus unique information was rr sured by examining the rater's data above comparing the percentage of common infor: tion exchanged by the group (amount of c' mon information exchanged / total amoun common information available l 100%) to percentage of unique information exchang This produced two values for each group t were analyzed using a repeated measu ANOVA.
The extent to which participants contribu information that supported, opposed, or i neutral to their predisoussion preferences I assessed by the percentage of availa unique information in each category that e: participant chose to contribute (amo exchanged/amount available l 100%). T analysis examined only the unique informat: so this analysis could be done at the indivic level using a repeated measures ANO' Because behavior of participants within same group may be correlated to some ex (i.e., since each is going through the sa experience -good or bad -and may react in a somewhat similar manner), a group nested within treatment term was used in the ANOVA to account for this possible correlation.
Information Use
Determining the extent of information processing and use is difficult because it requires an understanding of individual cognition, something that the participants themselves may not be able to report accurately. Three different approaches were used to triangulate across methods. First, a perceptual measure was used (see Petty and Cacioppo 1986, pp. 36-37 for a discussion of perceptual measures of information use). The post-session questionnaire included an item designed to measure perceived information usage (i.e., the degree to which participants thought about and used information contributed by others, three items, aipha=.81, l=iow, 7=high). See Appendix A for the measure. it was analyzed at the individual level using ANOVA with a group nested within treatment term.
Second, information use was considered by examining the information learned by each participant at the end of the group discussions (see Cacioppo, et al. 1983 for a description of this approach). information learned is the information participants recalled at the end of the experiment -information that they did not have in their initial task descriptions. This inforn.ation must have been received and processed during discussions because infornation must be processed to be stored in memory (see Stasser and Titus 1987) . Participants were asked to list ail information they remembered in a free recall question on the post-session questionnaire. Only the information that the participant did not have at the beginning of group discussion was counted as information learned. These data were analyzed at the individual level using ANOVA with a group nested within treatment term.
Third, the number of groups that contributed sufficient information to the discussion to identify the optimal alternative and that actually Information Sharing in Groups selected that alternative as their decision was calculated (see Petty and Cacioppo 1986 for a discussion of this approach). if groups had sufficient information and made the optimal decision, then they likely processed it appropriately. if they had sufficient information, but did not make the optimal decision, then they likely did not process the available information correctly. This was coded as a zero-one varfabie using only those groups that had sufficient information to identify the optimal decision; Appendix B describes the approach used to determine if the groups had sufficient information. Groups making the optimal decision received a one; groups not making the optimal decision received a zero. This was analyzed at the group level using ANOVA.
Outcomes
Decision time was measured by the number of minutes required for the group to reach a decision. Decision quality was coded as a zeroone variable. Groups making the optimal decision received a one: groups not making the optimal decision received a zero. Both decision time and decision quality were analyzed at the group ievei using ANOVA.
Consensus change was measured by asking each participant to make an individual decision before group discussion and after group discussion. Prediscussion and post-discussion consensus for sach group were each caicuiated using the procedure of Watson, et al. (1988) . Con-e%rs change was calculated as post-discussion consensus minus prediscussion consensus, so that positive numbers indicated increased consensus after discussion. This was analyzed at the group level using ANOVA.
Two additional perceptual measures were included on the post-session questionnaire, both with scales of l=iow, 7=high: satisfaction (5 items, aipha=.82), and information credibility (i.e., the degree of accuracy participants attrfbuted to information contributed by others, 4 items, aipha=.86). See Appendix A for the questions. These were analyzed at the individ-Information Shadng in Groups ual level using ANOVA with a group nested within treatment term.
Results
Overview
As discussed in detail below, GSS groups exchanged more information than non-GSS groups. They had similar preferences for common rather than unique information and for preference-supporting information rather than neutral or preference-opposing information. Participants in GSS groups were less likely to have actually used the information they exchanged, but took longer to make decisions. Only one GSS and one non-GSS group made the optimal decision, and there were no differences in consensus change.
Information exchange
Hl -that GSS groups would exchange more information -was supported, whether one considers all types of information (F(1,12)= 10.52, p=.OO7), only common information (F(1,12)=9.43, p=.OlO), or only unique information (F(1,12)=8.05, p=.O15) <see Table 3 .) In general, the verbal discussion in the GSS groups added little new informa.tion beyond what was contained in the ;,ectronic discussion. On average, groups cont'ibuted about one new piece of information veljally that was not contained in the electronic &cussions.
H2 -that groups would shol*l e! preference for common information over unique information -was supported.
As shown in Table 3 , groups exchanged a greater percentage of common information than unique information (F(1,12)=10.89, p=.OO7).
H3a -that participants were more likely to contribute information favoring their prediscussion preferences -was supported. Members of both GSS and non-GSS groups were more likely to exchange information supporting their prediscussion preferences than neutral information or information opposing their choicr (F(2,104)=13.39, p=.OOl , post-hoc Tukey tes at a=.05) (see Table 3 ). H3b -that this imb: ante would be smaller in GSS groups -w: not supported.
There was no interactic between information type and GSS us (F(2,104)=1.43, p=.243).
lnforma tion use
Three measures of information were used test H4 -that members of GSS groups wou be more likely to use the informatic exchanged. The first measure used perceptu data. Counter to the hypothesis, members GSS groups perceived themselves to ha\ used information to a lesser extent than men bers of non-GSS groups (F(1,125)=14.9 p=.OOl) (see Table 3 ).
The second measure was the informatic learned. Counter to the hypothesis, membe. of GSS groups recalled less initially unknot, information than members of non-GSS group (F(1,126)=15.93, p=.OOl), suggesting that the were less likely to process previously unknow unique information mentioned during the di: cussion (see Table 3 ).
The third measure was the number of group that had sufficient information available t identify the optimal alternative and actual made the optimal decision. All seven GS groups had sufficient information in their UC cussions to identify the optimal alternative, bL only one (14%) made the optimal decisio (three could not come to a unanimous dec sion, and three chose the suboptimal alternz tive favored by the majority). Only three of 10 seven non-GSS groups had sufficient informi tion to identify the optimal alternative, and c these only one (33%) made the optimal dec, sion (the other two could not come to a unan mous decision). All of the other four non-GS groups chose the suboptimal alternativ favored by the majority. The difference between the GSS and non-GSS groups ar not significant (F(1,9)=0.40, p=.543). As a aside, note that the two groups making th optimal decision both had initial prediscussio majorities favoring the auboptimal alternative. In the five groups that did not make unanimous decisions, at least one (sometimes two or three) participant whose prediscussion information led him/her to chose the optimal alternative refused to change his/her preference to match the majority.
Based on these three measures. H4 was not supported.
Outcomes
H5 -that GSS groups would take longer to H7 -that GSS groups would have greater reach a decision -was not supported. GSS consensus change -was not supported.
gl~dps did not require more time to complete the task, although this term approached significanr,: (F(1,13)=4.32, p=.O60) (see Table 3 ). Conr;idering only the four GSS and five non-GSL +ups that reached unanimous decisicx, there is a significantly different pattern: GSs groups took much longer (means of 20.28 minutes versus 7.95 minutes, F( 1,7)=15.40, p=.OO6).
H6 -that GSS groups would make better decisions -was not supported. GSS groups did not make better decisions (F(1,13)=0.00, p=l) (see Table 3 ).
There was no difference in consensus change (F(1,13)=1.89, ~~192) (see Table 3 ).
Members of GSS groups reported no differences in satisfaction (F(1,126)=0.01, p=.921), but had less credibility in the information contributed by others (F(1,126) =74.39, p=.OOl) (see Table 3 ).
Discussion
The objective of this study was to examine information exchange and use in group decision making. Previous research has found discussions in non-GSS groups to be ill-structured and to focus on only a very few pieces of common information (Stasser and Titus 1985; . This experiment had similar findings. Verbally interacting groups exchanged only a small portion of the available information and made poor decisions both because of this lack of information and because they did not effectively use what little unique information they gained from this exchange. Thus, one implication is that forming non-GSS groups with a diversity of information and knowledge in the hope that participants will pool their unique information to make better decisions may be somewhat optimistic: only one of the seven groups in this study did so. Four of the remaining six groups chose the suboptimal alternative favored by the majority, and two could not make a decision.
Clearly, some means :a increase information exchange and use i.c needed. As theorized above, a GSS providi?g pUrallelism, anonymity, and a group mer:'!cry will increase information exchange. GSS use increased the amount of information exchanged by 50%, enabling members of a// GSS groups to exchange sufficient information to identify the optimal altemative. But participants did not effectively use this new, unique information to improve their decision making, even though instructed that they could not make a good decision without it. Only one GSS group selected the optimal alternative.
Of the other six groups, three chose the suboptimal alternative favored by the majority, and three could not make a decision. There was no difference in consensu: change, suggesting that counter to the hypoth esis, the decisions of the GSS groups were n( more based on information than were the deci sions of the non-GSS groups.
Three pieces of evidence suggest that thr problem was that members of GSS group: were less likely to have used the previousI\ unknown unique information they received during group discussion. First, members of GEE groups perceived themselves to have usec less information contributed by others Second, members of GSS groups recalled lesr previously unknown unique informatior exchanged during their discussions than die members of non-GSS groups. Third, a smalle: percentage of GSS groups with sufficient information to identify the optimal alternative did SC (one out of seven groups versus one out 0; three).
I conclude that while GSS use enabled groups to exchange more information, enough to identify the optimal alternative, it did not helpperhaps even hindered -participants' ability to process it. In short, GSS use can lead participants to more information, but it can't make them think about it.
Lack of information processing
The reasons for the inhibited infor,rraticn processing in GSS groups is unclear. Foul speculations for future research are offered. 'irformation integration (i.e., participant= cannot process information fast enough), GL.4 dctsign and use (i.e., the GSS structure irnbndr&d information processing), information creti?dity (i.e., participants did not believe the information), and information saliency (i.e., important information was not conspicuous).
Information Integration
One possibility for the poor information processing may lie in participants' abilities to integrate newly received, unique information into their existing base of information. During discussion, participants must engage in three simultaneous activities (information recall, information exchange, and information use). Engaging in any one activity limits the ability to engage in the other two because humans have a limited amount of cognitive resources. Factual information requires more cognitive processing than information about others' preferences (Petty and Cacioppo 1988) , so when participants receive information too quickly, they may process information about others' preferences more readily than factual information. Group decisions in hidden profile tasks depend more on participants' prediscussion choices than on the information exchanged during discussion because information is often overlooked (Gigone and Hastie 1993) .
If factual information arrives faster than one item every three minutes, individuals have difficulty integrating it with existing information (Streufert and Swezey 1988) . While the volume of information was not very large (cf. Stasser and Titus 1987) , it clearly required the processing of more than one piece of information every three minutes. Therefore, one plausible explanation for the lack of information processing may lie in the cognitive limitations of individuals' ability to integrate information. Prior to group discussion, participants had sufficient uninterrupted time to process the available information and formulate a decision preference. But during discussions, participants in both GSS and non-GSS groups were unable to process and integrate the new information.
Argued previously was that the group memory provided by the GSS would enable participants to disengage themselves from discussion to process the information received from others. However, the increased amount of information in the GSS discussions might have overwhelmed participants so that they lacked the dedicated time needed to adequately process and integrate newly received information -or they perceived they had insufficient time and therefore did not attempt to. As a result, they may have relied more heavily on their prediscussion choices that were based on incomplete information.
GSS @esign and Use
A second possibility may lie in the design of the GSS and the way it was used in this study. The participants had little prior GSS experience, so it is possible that their lack of expertence influenced the lack of information use. However, there is a more fundamental issue. A separate topic was created to hold information about each of the four alternatives. To read information about an alternative, participants had to open it and scroll through the information it contained. This approach to using Group Outliner is recommended by the developers, is taught in training courses,' and has been used in many meetings. Organizing and processing information by aiternatives is the usual approach for this type of task (Payne 1982) and can significantly improve idea generation (Dennis, et al. 1996) .
However, this alternative-based organization creates difficulty in comparing information across alternatives. For example, to compare information for the alternatives on any one cdtenon (e.g., letters of recommendation), partlcipants had to open one alternative, scroll through several paragraphs of information to find the information about letters of recommendation, close the alternative, open the next alternative, scroll through several paragraphs, and so on. This requires many keystrokes, and just finding the information buried in the paragraphs of text takes time. The difficufty in finding information -or even the perception of difficulty -can affect information usage. Decision makers often trade off decision quality for time; the extra time and effort associated with obtaining information can induce them not to bother to find it (Beach and Mitchell 1978; Payne 1982) . Thus, the way the information was captured in the GSS may have been effective for increasing information exchange, but may not have been effective for promoting its use in decision making.
Information Credibility
Another possibility for the reduced processing of unique information in GSS groups may lie in the credibility of the information. To cause a change in a previous decision (in this case, the individual decision made prior to group discussion), information must be important, novel (i.e., not previously processed), and credible (Morley and Walker 1987) . In this case, the unique information received during discussion was both impc tant and novel. However, members of GSSs were less likely to find it credible and thus may have intentionally disregarded it. There are at least two plausible explanations for this reduced credibility.
The first is a negative anonymity effect on credibility. The credibility of the source of information can be important to the acceptance and processing of a message, particularly when the information is ambiguous or difficult to process (Petty and Cacioppo 1988) The most poignant comments were from one of the subjects in a pilot test who claimed not to believe any of the information in the GSS because it was anonymous, and there was no accountability; anyone could make up information at will to support his or her position and never have to suffer the consequences of lying. It may be that the anonymity of the GSS used in this study made the information more suspect because it was more difficult to verify the source's credibility.
A second reason for reduced credibility may be a reduced ability to challenge the information's contribuior. In all non-GSS groups, at least one (usually several) occasion when unique information presented to the group was immediately challenged (e.g., "Really? I didn't get that.") was observed. The contributor would then cortirm the validity of the information, and discussion would move on. Similar challenges were seen in GSS groups, but the response would come much iater or not at all. It may be that the reduced ability to provide immediate, confirming feedback to challenges reduced the credibility of the information.
Information Saliency
A fourth possibility for the lack of information processing may be that information presented in GSS groups is less salient and therefore more likely to be overlooked. When a participant in a non-GSS group contributes information verbally, the group's attention is focused on that information (Harkins and Petty 1987) because it is difficult to ignore someone speaking directly to you. Information is presented to you (a "push" approach). V&al discussions tend to loop back and repeatedly address issues that participants believe to be important (Fisher 1980; Stasser, et al. 1989 ). The redundant presentation of supposedly important information means that there is less chance it will be overlooked (Rao and Jarvenpaa 1991) and thus, a greater chance that this redundant information will be used in making decisions. Simply put, the information that participants believe to be important (but not necessarily the 'right' information that leads to the optimal decision) becomes very salient through repeated verbal presentation and is used by the group in making its decision.
In contrast, information for GSS groups is contained in paragraphs of text in a pool of information. It is simple to ignore the information because no one is actively placing it in front of participants. Participants must actively search out and review information -a "pull" approach that requires more effort on their part. Likewise, there may be less systematic redundancy in the GSS informati:r., because information seen as important by participants is less likely to be intention@y repeated in the GSS as it is in verbal discdsskn (while there is often redundancy in GSS information . it is nc! lone intentionally to highlight supposedly imp*_+tnt information). Thus the combination of ti:e need to exert effort to actively pull infon&on from the GSS and the reduced repetiti-11 of supposedly important information may have encouraged less information processing in GSS groups.
Implications for research and practice
This raises several issues for future research. First, this study suffers from the usual limitations of laboratory experiments (see McGrath Information Sharing in GIVU~S 1982). Ad hoc groups of undergraduate students with little intrinsic motivation and little prior GSS or business experience were studied. The task was comparatively simple -it required less than 30 minutes of work. Therefore, additional basic evidence is needed to support or refute the conclusion of increased information exchange and red.:ced information processing in GSS groups.
Second, additional research is needed to develop ways to assist participants in effectively processing newly received informatioc and integrating it into their current understanding of the problem space. Developing GSS software that assists participants in this information integration process is possible (Grise and Gallupe 1994) , but there is as yet no definitive empirical evidence. Software that imposes a structure on the information may help groups process it by making it easier to identify important information as well as making it more salient (e.g., COPE: Eden and Ackerman 1992). However, such structure adds complexity and increases the effort to contribute information, and may, therefore, reduce the amount of information exchanged. While increased structure may improve decision performance, decision makers often prefer simple rather than complex techniques, perhaps because of satisficing (Kottemann and Dallis 1991) . Thus, additional research is needed on the development and empirical testing of tools providing techniques designed to ilp;)rove information processing.
Third, evidence is needed to determire if anonymity is useful in this situation. Anorrimity has been found to be important for groups whose members have different power artd status, but to have fewer benefits for peers si;nilar to those in this study (Nunamaker, et al. 1991) . The question raised in this study is: Does anonymity reduce source credibility to such an extent that groups reduce their information processing?
This study has several implications for managers striving to improve the exchange and use of information in organizational problem solving. Participants in organizational project teams and task forces are often selected because they bring some additional unique information or expertise to the team. It is believed that by pooling this unique information, these teams will make better decisions. This and prior studies suggest differently: participants exchanged only a small portion of the available information. Thus, one implication for managers is that improving information exchange in unaided teams is an important first step in improving organizational decision making. In this study, the use of GSS increased the exchange of information so that alternatives were considered in more detail. Providing GSS, therefore, appears to be one way to increase this information exchange.
However, improving information exchange is only the first step. The increased exchange of information in GSS groups led to no better decisions. I believe the key problem in using this information for both GSS and non-GSS groups was the difficulty in assessing the new information received during group discussion and integrating it into their existing information base, which encouraged participants to overlook this information in favor of the information assessed and integrated prior to group discussion. .
One implication is, therefore, to structure group meetings (both GSS and non-GSS) to provide sufficient time for participants to study, assess, and integrate this new information before they must make decisions. One option is to separate information exchange from the decision-making process in which it is used. In this way, participants could hold one meeting to discuss a problem or opportunity, break for several hours or days to assess the information, and hold a second meeting to make the actual decision. This structure is similar to the "incubation" period for idea generation.
The lack of salience of the "important" information also may have been a factor. Important information may have become lost in a sea of information. A simple technique would be for the group to actively identify the important factors in any decision (either before or during the meeting) and intentionally highlight any information about those factors by moving it to the top of the lists of information about each alter-native. Conversely, adding a little more structure to the discussion topics in the GSS might help make the important information more salient (e.g., having two topics for each alternative -one for "critical information," one for 'other information").
Another alternative is to develop new group p:ocesses and ways of using GSS tools to help participants better assess information and identify important information. Encouraging the active processing of information, possibly through the use of structured techniques such as multi-criteria decision making, is one approach. Another may be to reconsider the commonly used alternative-based way of organizing information in a GSS, which may be useful in capturing information, but may be counter-productive in promoting its use for decision making. Simply switching to a criteriabased structure may improve information use, but this and other possibilities will have to await future research.
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